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One of the major benefits of belonging to a prestigious group is that it affects the way you are
viewed by others. Here I use a simple mathematical model to explore the implications of this
“prestige bias” when candidates undergo repeated rounds of evaluation. In the model, candidates
who are evaluated most highly are admitted to a “prestige class”, and their membership biases future
rounds of evaluation in their favor. I use the language of Bayesian inference to describe this bias,
and show that it can lead to a runaway effect in which the weight given to the prior expectation
associated with a candidate’s class becomes stronger with each round. Most dramatically, the
strength of the prestige bias after many rounds undergoes a first-order transition as a function of
the precision of the examination on which the evaluation is based.
I. INTRODUCTION
It would seem that in just about any competitive hu-
man endeavor, there inevitably arises a notion of prestige.
For example, students compete to get into prestigious
universities, job-seekers vie for positions at prestigious
companies, researchers jockey to publish in prestigious
journals and dream of winning prestigious awards, etc.
But if you spend enough time in the treadmill of any of
these competitive industries, you naturally end up ask-
ing the question: what is the utility of all this prestige?
Why do we need a “prestige class”? Does it provide our
industry with some benefit? And how does our focus on
prestige alter the functioning of the industry?
Motivated by these kinds of questions, in this paper
I focus on describing mathematically the way in which
the notion of prestige affects our processes of selection
and evaluation. The primary viewpoint adopted here is
that a major function of prestige is to affect the way a
person is evaluated by others. If a particular person is a
member of the prestige class, then their candidacy dur-
ing selection and evaluation processes is given a boost
relative to similar candidates that do not belong to the
prestige class. For example, two applicants for graduate
school may have similar grades and exam scores, but if
one candidate comes from a more prestigious university
then their application will, in general, be evaluated more
highly. This “prestige bias” arises naturally, since met-
rics like grades and exam scores are imprecise measures
of a student’s ability, and thus the evaluator looks for
any other information available to help with their deci-
sion. Belonging to a prestigious group suggests that the
candidate was ranked highly by some other evaluator in
the past, and this provides a prior expectation (like a
second opinion) that biases the decision in their favor.
This dynamic, in which a candidate to whom pres-
tige has been conferred enjoys significant advantages over
other candidates, has been the subject of a significant
amount of quantitative research, particularly as it re-
lates to academic hiring and evaluation. For example, it
has long been recognized that academic science exhibits
a “rich get richer” effect [1], wherein prestige enables
opportunity and opportunity enables greater prestige.
More recent work has focused on quantifying “prestige
hierarchies” among academic institutions [2], and shown
that the prestige ranking of a researcher’s PhD institu-
tion is a very strong predictor of their success on the
academic job market. Further, this institutional prestige
largely predicts the productivity of early-career faculty
[3], and seems to heavily influence which research topics
develop a strong following [4]. Prestige also biases the
way that academic papers are reviewed. For example,
in a recent experiment with two disjoint program com-
mittees for an academic conference, the committee with
access to the authors’ identities and institutions was be-
tween 1.6 and 2.1 times more likely to accept papers from
famous authors and/or prestigious institutions relative
to the committee for which such information was blinded
[5]. (See Ref. 6 for a larger review of this effect.) Prestige
bias can have a particularly pernicious interaction with
demographic bias [7], and much work has been devoted to
studying the driving factors for the under-representation
of women, in particular, in academic positions (see, e.g.,
Refs. [8–11]).
In this paper, the major goal is to suggest a model
for thinking about prestige bias using the language of
Bayesian inference across iterated rounds of evaluation.
Similar language has been used to discuss “herd behav-
ior” in decision-making processes like investing [12], in
the review of academic papers [13], and in the adoption
of academic paradigms [14]. In terms of the evaluation
of candidates, Bayesian inference provides a way to in-
corporate information from an imprecise examination of
the candidate with prior knowledge about the class from
which the candidate comes. This process, when imple-
mented optimally, maximizes the probability for the eval-
uator to select the best candidate. But it also provides a
strong advantage for candidates from the prestige class,
and can lead to persistent biases.
The model considered here is of a repeated process of
examination and evaluation, in which evaluators use their
knowledge of a candidate’s class and their understanding
of the distribution of abilities among members of that
class to assess and rank candidates. After each round of
evaluation a new “prestige class” is defined, which forms
the basis for a Bayesian prior for the next round of eval-
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2uations, and so on. I study the dynamics of this selection
process and the degree of advantage it provides for mem-
bers of the prestige class.
Crucial to the behavior of the model is the question of
how the prior expectation of candidate ability is formed
in the mind of the evaluator. I consider two different
cases. In Case I, the prior expectation during each round
is a perfectly accurate reflection of the actual range of
abilities of each class. In Case II, the prior is constructed
based on the estimates in ability from the previous round
of evaluation. Case II exhibits qualitatively different dy-
namics in the evaluation process as compared to Case
I, and in particular it can produce a runaway effect in
which the weight given to the prior expectation becomes
stronger with each successive round of evaluation.
Whether such a “runaway prestige bias” scenario oc-
curs in Case II turns out to depend on the precision of
the examination to which candidates are subjected. The
most dramatic feature of the model is that, as a function
of decreasing exam precision, there is a first-order tran-
sition in the weight given to the prior expectation after
many rounds of evaluation. When the exam is precise,
it allows evaluators to form accurate assessments of each
candidate, rather than basing their assessment strongly
on the prior expectation for the candidate’s class. When
the exam is less precise than this critical value, however,
there is a runaway prestige bias effect that is accompa-
nied by a “freezing out” of the prestige class, such that
the prestige class becomes impossible to break into or fall
out of.
In the remainder of this paper, I first define the model
being studied (Sec. II), and then give a simplified deriva-
tion of the first-order transition that produces the run-
away prestige bias effect (Sec. III). I then provide numer-
ical results in Sec. IV and conclude with a brief discussion
in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
In the model considered here, a large number N of
candidates undergo a process of repeated evaluation. For
simplicity, I assume that candidates are characterized by
only a single parameter x, which I refer to as “ability”,
that is constant and unchanging in time. For definiteness
one can take x to be distributed among the candidates
according to a normal (Gaussian) distribution with mean
0 and variance 1 – this choice defines the units for ability.
In the future, a normal distribution of the variable x with
mean µ and variance σ2 will be denoted N (x;µ, σ2), so
that one can write
Prob(x) = N (x;µ = 0, σ2 = 1). (1)
The goal of the evaluation process is to identify those
candidates with the highest ability. Each round of eval-
uation begins with all candidates taking an exam (one
could equally well decide to call it an “interview”). Let us
suppose that the exam score is an unbiased estimator of
the ability x of the candidate, with a finite, constant pre-
cision. (This is a somewhat optimistic assumption, and
the effects of systematic biases in the exam are discussed
in Sec. V.) In particular, let’s say that for a candidate
with ability x the exam score s is chosen from a normal
distribution with mean x and standard deviation w. In
other words, the probability density for a candidate with
ability x to get a score s on the exam is
Prob(s|x) = N (s;µ = x, σ2 = w2). (2)
I refer to w as the standard error of the exam; larger w
implies a less precise exam. (The quantity 1/w2 is often
called the “precision”.) w is the one major parameter of
the model.
After each round of exams, the candidates are given a
ranking that depends on their exam score. In the first
round of evaluation, evaluators have no prior expectation
about each candidate, and so candidates are ranked sim-
ply in descending order by their exam score s. The top-
scoring fraction f are admitted into the “prestige class”,
while the remaining 1 − f are considered to be part of
the “non-prestige class”. The parameter f can be taken
as a measure of the exclusivity of the prestige class. For
definiteness I fix f = 0.05 for all numerical calculations
in this paper.1
In the second and all subsequent rounds of evaluation,
the evaluator knows both the candidate’s exam score s
and whether the candidate belongs to the prestige class.
This latter piece of information brings with it a prior
belief about the candidate’s likely ability, encoded in the
form of a prior distribution Pprior(x). Bayesian inference
gives the optimal way to combine the exam score s with
the prior Pprior(x), by using Bayes’ Rule: [15]
Prob(x|s) = Prob(s|x)
Prob(s)
Pprior(x). (3)
Here, Prob(s|x) is the probability for a candidate with
ability x to achieve the score s on the exam; in this model
it is given by Eq. (2). Prob(s) =
∫
Prob(s|x)Pprior(x)dx
is a normalization factor. From Eq. (3) one can cal-
culate the expectation value of the candidate’s ability,∫
xProb(x|s)dx. I will refer to this expectation value as
the estimated ability ε(s) of a candidate with exam score
s. In particular,
ε(s) =
∫
xN (s;µ = x, σ2 = w2)Pprior(x)dx∫ N (s;µ = x, σ2 = w2)Pprior(x)dx . (4)
In the special case where the prior distribution is also
normal, Pprior(x) = N (x;µ = µprior, σ2 = σ2prior), this
1 In principle, f is a second parameter of the model, which can
be explored on equal footing with w. In practice, however, the
quantities of interest have a very weak dependence on f when
f  1; see Appendix A.
3equation can be evaluated explicitly, giving [15]
ε(s) =
µpriorw
2 + sσ2prior
w2 + σ2prior
. (5)
Notice that ε(s) → s in the limit where the exam is
very precise compared to the prior (w  σprior), and
ε(s)→ µprior in the opposite limit of high standard error
(w  σprior). In the remainder of this paper I will work
within the assumption of a Gaussian prior, so that Eq.
(5) is applicable. In other words, the prior distribution
used by evaluators is taken to be characterized fully by
its mean µprior and variance σ
2
prior.
The crucial question, and the central topic of this pa-
per, is how the prior distribution is formed in the mind
of the evaluator. In general, the prior for a given round
of evaluation is based on the abilities, or perceived abili-
ties, of the class to which the candidate belongs (prestige
or non-prestige). One can consider two extreme cases
for how an evaluator might form their perception of the
candidate’s class:
• Case I: Prior based on perfect knowledge. The
most idealistic scenario is that the evaluator knows
with perfect accuracy the distribution of abilities
within each class. That is, following each round of
evaluation, the evaluator becomes well acquainted
with the members of each class (or, at least, with
a representative set of members from each class),
and comes to understand their true abilities. This
knowledge allows the evaluator to form a perfectly
accurate estimation of the mean and variance in
ability for the candidate’s class, which can be used
in the next round of evaluations.
Thus, in Case I, µprior is equal to the mean in true
ability µx for the candidate’s class, and σ
2
prior is
equal to the variance in true ability σ2x.
• Case II: Prior based on past evaluation. A less
optimistic (but, unfortunately, probably more re-
alistic) scenario is one in which the evaluators ac-
quire no new knowledge about the candidates af-
ter the evaluation. In this sense, the evaluators do
not have enough information to form an accurate
prior. Still, the evaluators may conclude that they
do have knowledge of the candidates’ abilities, since
they explicitly estimated their abilities during the
previous round of evaluation. For such evaluators,
the natural choice of a prior distribution is the dis-
tribution of estimated abilities ε from the previous
round.
In other words, in Case II, µprior for round n is
equal to the mean in estimated ability µε from the
previous round n− 1, and similarly σ2prior = σ2ε .
In principle, one can interpolate continuously between
Case I and Case II. That is, an evaluator may form their
opinion about the abilities of each class by combining
their past evaluations with some new information, so that
the mean and variance in the prior distribution are in-
termediate between (µx, σ
2
x) and (µε, σ
2
ε). This kind of
interpolation would introduce another parameter into the
model and is not considered here, outside of a brief com-
ment in Sec. V.
After each round of evaluation, candidates are ranked
according to their estimated ability ε, and the top frac-
tion f comprise the prestige class during the subsequent
round.
III. THEORY OF THE FIRST-ORDER
TRANSITION
In this section I use a simplified theoretical description
to derive the primary feature of this model, namely the
first-order transition as a function of the exam precision
that occurs in Case II. The major simplification used in
this section is to assume that all statistical distributions
are normal. As will be shown by numeric calculations in
the following section, the relevant distributions are not
normal in general, and this may alter certain numerical
values but not the qualitative features being derived.
To begin, let us consider the relationship between
three statistical distributions that characterize a partic-
ular class (prestige or non-prestige). The first is the dis-
tribution of abilities, x, for members within the class.
The second is the distribution of the class’s exam scores
s. The third is the distribution of estimated ability ε,
as perceived by the evaluators. Let us suppose that the
distribution of abilities among members of a given class
is characterized by a mean µx and a variance σ
2
x. When
these candidates take the exam, the distribution of their
exam scores can be found by convolving the distribution
Prob(x) with Prob(s|x). This process gives a mean score
µs = µx (since the exam is unbiased), while the variance
in exam scores is somewhat larger than the variance in
ability, σ2s = σ
2
x + w
2.
The process of Bayesian estimation, however, reduces
the variance in the exam score by effectively averaging
the exam score with the prior mean. One can see this
reduction by, for example, rearranging Eq. (5) as
ε(s) = µprior + (s− µprior)
σ2prior
w2 + σ2prior
.
The second term in this equation shows that the range of
exam scores among candidates is mapped onto a narrower
range of estimated ability, with a reduction in range by a
factor σ2prior/(w
2+σ2prior). In essence, through the process
of Bayesian inference an evaluator “corrects” an unusu-
ally large or small exam score to bring it closer in line
with the prior expectation for the group mean. When
the standard error of the exam is much wider than the
width of the prior, w2  σ2prior, the candidate is gener-
ally assumed to have an ability very close to that of the
prior mean µprior, regardless of the candidate’s score on
the exam.
4The resulting variance in estimated ability, σ2ε , can be
calculated using σ2ε =
∫
[ε(s)−µε]2Prob(s)ds, which gives
σ2ε =
σ4prior(w
2 + σ2x)
(w2 + σ2prior)
2
. (6)
This equation implies, in general, a reduction in the vari-
ance of ε relative to the variance σ2x in actual ability.
For example, even in the case when the prior is per-
fectly well-formed, such that σ2prior = σ
2
x, the variance
in estimated ability σ2ε is smaller than σ
2
x by a factor
σ2ε/σ
2
x = σ
2
x/(w
2 + σ2x) < 1. Notice that this reduction is
especially large when the exam is very imprecise, w  σ2x.
In effect, when the exam is a sufficiently poor indicator
of candidate ability that it cannot distinguish between
different members of the same class, evaluators become
conservative and tend to assume that all candidates are
simply typical of their class.
The rate at which candidates are “promoted” to the
prestige class, or “demoted” from it, depends on the over-
lap of the distributions of estimated ability ε for the two
classes. In this sense, the smallness of σ2ε that arises
from the evaluators’ conservative estimation makes class
mobility artificially small. In Case I, this issue of low
mobility is at least not compounded from one round to
another, since the prior expectation is accurately recali-
brated after every round of evaluation. However, in Case
II the smallness of σ2ε arising from Bayesian inference can
become a persistent problem, because it forms the basis
for the prior used during the next round.
Let us now focus on the evolution of σ2ε with n in
Case II. In this case, the prior distribution for evalua-
tion during round n + 1 is based on the distribution of
estimated ability ε from the previous round, and thus
σ2prior,n+1 = σ
2
ε,n. Equation (6) therefore defines a recur-
rence relation for σ2ε :
σ2ε,n+1 = σ
2
ε,n
σ2ε,n(σ
2
x + w
2)
(σ2ε,n + w
2)2
. (7)
Let us treat σ2x as a constant, independent of n. This
assumption is not strictly correct, since the members of
the class may change from one round to another. How-
ever, σ2x cannot change parametrically with time, since its
maximum value is σ2x = 1 (corresponding to a randomly-
chosen prestige class) and its minimum value for the cho-
sen value of f is σ2x ≈ 0.4 (a perfectly-selected prestige
class; see Appendix A for a derivation). With this as-
sumption of constant σ2x, one can notice that Eq. (7) has
two nonzero fixed points, defined by σ2ε,n+1 = σ
2
ε,n ≡
σ2ε,fixed:
σ2ε,fixed =
σ2x − w2
2
±
√
(σ2x + w
2)(σ2x − 3w2)
2
. (8)
The larger of these two fixed points is stable, in the sense
that repeated rounds of evaluation tend to bring the value
of σ2ε,n closer to the larger fixed point, while the lesser of
FIG. 1. Flow of the variance in estimated ability, σ2ε , for a
given class of candidates under repeated rounds of evaluation.
σ2ε determines the weight given to the prior expectation, such
that when σ2ε → 0 the prior expectation in dominant and the
candidate’s exam has no influence on their assessed ability.
The horizontal axis indicates the standard error of the exam,
w. Both σε and w are normalized to the standard deviation
in actual candidate ability, σx. The thick, solid line shows the
stable fixed point as a function of w, and arrows indicate the
direction of flow under repeated rounds of evaluation. The
dashed line shows the unstable fixed point. The discontinuity
in the thick line indicates a discontinuous transition in the
fixed point of σ2ε as a function of w.
the two fixed points is unstable. The flow of σ2ε,n with
increased n is illustrated in Fig. 1.
When the standard error w of the exam exceeds a cer-
tain critical value wc, the only remaining fixed point is
σ2ε = 0. In particular,
σ2ε,fixed = 0 at w > wc =
σx√
3
. (9)
The vanishing of the nonzero fixed points at w > wc
implies that there is a first-order transition in the fixed-
point value of σ2ε as a function of the standard error.
That is, when w < wc, the variance in estimated ability
σ2ε approaches a finite value after many rounds of evalu-
ation (so long as the initial value of σ2ε is not very small).
However, when w > wc, the value of σ
2
ε → 0 in the limit
of large n.
This transition in σ2ε as a function of w implies a tran-
sition in the way the evaluation process works at long
times. As long as σε is finite, there remains a finite chance
for a candidate in a given class to distinguish themselves
(either positively or negatively) by achieving an excep-
tional score on the exam. However, when σε → 0, the
prior becomes infinitely strong, and all members within
the class are viewed identically. One can think of this
collapse of σε as a “runaway confirmation bias” effect, in
which the evaluator’s impression about a particular class
gets stronger and more specific with each round of eval-
uation. The existence of a σε → 0 transition for a given
class does not depend on the interaction between the two
classes.
5In fact, since there are two classes, each with a differ-
ent range of ability for its members, there are in general
two transitions as a function of w. At sufficiently small
w, the fixed-point value of σ2ε is finite for both classes,
and candidates are exchanged between the two classes
at a relatively high rate even in the long-time limit. On
the other hand, when w is very large, both classes un-
dergo the collapse of the prior illustrated in Fig. 1, and
at long times all exchange between the classes is frozen
out. However, since σ2x is smaller for the prestige class
than for the non-prestige class (provided that f < 1/2),
there exists a range of w for which the prestige class has
a collapsed prior while the non-prestige class does not. In
this range it remains possible for a member of the non-
prestige class to score sufficiently highly on the exam to
be promoted into the prestige class, but such exchanges
occur with an exponentially low rate.
Thus, in terms of inter-class mobility, there are two
transitions as a function of increasing w. At the first
transition the rate of inter-class exchange collapses from
an order-unity value to an exponentially small value, as
the prior becomes infinitely strong for the prestige class
but not for the non-prestige class. At the second tran-
sition σ2ε → 0 for the non-prestige class as well, and the
rate of inter-class exchange collapses to zero.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section I present results from a numerical sim-
ulation of the dynamics defined in Sec. II. I explore how
the distributions of actual ability and estimated ability
evolve over successive rounds of evaluation, as well as the
rate of exchange between the two classes. Results are pre-
sented for Case I, where the prior is based on accurate
knowledge of the two classes, and for Case II, where the
prior is based on past evaluations.
Specifically, I simulate a large cohort of N candidates,
each with ability x chosen according to Eq. (1). Dur-
ing each round, each candidate is assigned an exam score
according to Eq. (2), and their estimated ability is evalu-
ated according to Eq. (5). For Case I, the prior is chosen
to reflect the true abilities of members of the candidate’s
class, and for Case II the prior reflects the estimates from
the previous round of evaluations (as detailed in Sec. II).
After εi is estimated for every candidate i, those with
the top scores are sorted into the prestige class, and the
process is repeated.
In addition to examining the statistical distributions of
x and ε, I also examine the rate at which candidates can
expect to move from one class to another. In particular,
I define the class mobility, M , as follows. Consider a can-
didate with ability that is precisely at the lower margin
of an ideally-chosen elite class. That is, consider a can-
didate with ability xm =
√
2 erfc−1(2f), where erfc−1(z)
is the inverse complementary error function, so that xm
constitutes the (1− f)th percentile of all candidates. M
is defined as the probability for such a candidate to score
(a)
(b)
FIG. 2. Distributions of actual ability (a) and estimated
ability (b) for the prestige class under the dynamics of Case
I, where the prior is based on accurate knowledge of the true
abilities within each class. Only the distributions for n = 2
and n = 5 are shown; larger values of n practically coincide
with the latter. Here the standard error of the exam w = 0.3.
highly enough on the exam to be promoted from the non-
prestige to the prestige class. In situations with precise
exams and weak priors, M approaches 1/2. On the other
hand, when the prior is strong and the exam is impre-
cise, M approaches zero. The transition in σ2ε implies a
concomitant collapse in the class mobility M .
Unless otherwise noted, all data below corresponds to
simulations of N = 105 candidates and is averaged over
1000 realizations.
A. Case I: Prior based on perfect knowledge
In Case I, the distributions of actual and estimated
ability quickly converge to a steady state under increased
iteration n. See, for example, Fig. 2, which considers the
case of w = 0.3; as shown below, this value of w is large
enough to induce a collapse in the prior distribution for
Case II. But in Case I there is no such collapse, since the
prior is accurately recalibrated at every round.
The lack of collapse in the prior distributions implies
that in the steady state there is a reasonable amount
of exchange between the two classes. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3, which shows that the class mobility quickly
saturates to a finite value with increasing n. The value
of the mobility declines as the exam becomes less precise
(i.e., when w increases), since evaluators give more weight
to the prior when the exam is imprecise. But in all cases
the mobility remains finite in the steady state.
6FIG. 3. The class mobility M as a function of time for
Case I, plotted for different values of the standard error w of
the exam. M quickly approaches a steady-state value, which
declines with increasing w but remains finite for all w and n.
B. Case II: Prior based on past evaluation
Unlike in Case I, in Case II the recursive use of past
evaluations can lead to a transition in the weight given
to prior evaluations. This is shown explicitly in Fig. 4,
which plots the variance in estimated ability of the pres-
tige class as a function of the standard error w of the
exam. As predicted in Sec. III, there is an abrupt tran-
sition in the value of σ2ε at long times when w exceeds
a critical value. It is worth noting that the y-intercept
in this plot gives the variance in ability of an ideally-
selected prestige class, σ2x ≈ 0.138 (see also the deriva-
tion in Appendix A). The transition σ2ε → 0 occurs at
w = wc ≈ 0.215, which is quantitatively consistent with
the value
√
σ2x/3 ≈ 0.214 derived in Sec. III.
The effects of the transition can also be seen in the
class mobility M (Fig. 5). At w < wc, the class mobility
n=100
n=2
n=5
n=10
FIG. 4. Variance σ2ε in the estimated ability of the prestige
class for Case II, plotted as a function of the standard error w
of the exam. Different curves correspond to different rounds
n of evaluation. Data is taken from numerical simulations of
a single cohort of N = 106 candidates. Compare Fig. 1.
FIG. 5. The class mobility M as a function of time for Case
II, plotted for different values of the standard error w of the
exam. When w < wc ≈ 0.215, M acquires a reasonably large
value in the steady state. When w > wc, the prior for the
prestige class collapses, and M falls abruptly to a very small
steady-state value. At w > 1/
√
3 ≈ 0.577 the prior collapses
for the non-prestige class as well, and M → 0.
approaches a steady state value, similar to Case I (Fig.
3). However, when w > wc the class mobility abruptly
collapses to a very small value, induced by the collapse
of the prior for the prestige class. When w is increased
even further, such that w > 1/
√
3, the prior collapses for
the non-prestige class as well, and M → 0 at large n.
Finally, one can see the effects of the collapse in the
distributions of ε. For example, Fig. 6 shows the distri-
butions of x and ε at w < wc, both of which are stable
as a function of n and have finite width. In contrast,
at w > wc (Fig. 7), the distribution of estimated ability
rapidly collapses to a delta function with increasing n.
V. DISCUSSION
To summarize, this paper has presented a simple,
single-parameter2 model of prestige bias under a process
of iterated evaluation. The major result is that there is
a first-order transition in the way the evaluation oper-
ates after many rounds of evaluation. If the exam used
for evaluation is less precise than a certain critical value,
there is a “freezing out” of the prestige class, which blocks
the turnover of candidates between classes regardless of
their ability.
It is important to mention that the existence of pres-
tige bias in this model does not require any assump-
tions about bad motivations or irrational behavior by
the evaluators. Such bias arises naturally in a Bayesian
description when rational actors undertake evaluations
2 In principle the exclusivity f of the prestige class can be treated
as an additional parameter, but see footnote 1 above and the
comment at the end of Appendix A.
7(a)
(b)
FIG. 6. Distributions of actual (a) and estimated (b) ability
for the prestige class under the dynamics of Case II, with
w = 0.1. Here the standard error w < wc, so that there is no
collapse of the prior. Data corresponds to n = 2; curves for
larger values of n practically coincide.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 7. Distributions of actual (a) and estimated (b) abil-
ity for the prestige class under the dynamics of Case II, with
w = 0.3. Here the standard error w > wc, which causes
the prior to collapse. This collapse is accompanied by a run-
away narrowing in the distribution of estimated ability with
increasing n, with a mean that is larger than the mean of
actual ability.
in the presence of incomplete information. The major
message of this paper, however, is that evaluators must
be conscientious about the basis for their prior assump-
tions about a candidate’s class. A runaway bias effect
occurs when evaluators heavily base their evaluations on
their impressions from the previous round of evaluation.
For example, a professor evaluating postdoc applicants
might think “ah, this candidate went to grad school at
Elite University X, and I remember how impressive all
the students from that university were when I was re-
viewing grad school admissions.” This line of thinking is
easy to fall into, but in effect it compounds one bias with
another, artificially widening the advantage that students
from Elite University X already experienced at the grad-
uate school stage. A runaway prestige bias effect can be
avoided only if there is a sufficiently accurate and un-
biased examination of candidate abilities, or if the eval-
uator conscientiously resets their prior expectations at
every stage of evaluation. This conscientious resetting
would require, for example, a person evaluating graduate
students from Elite University X to consider only their
direct experiences with other graduate students at Elite
University X, rather than drawing on a wider set of im-
pressions that encompass individuals at other stages of
their career.
Of course, the specific details of the model considered
in this paper have been highly schematic, and one should
be wary in general any time a physicist proposes a new
“simple model” [16]. But, if one were to develop an inter-
est in doing so, there are a number of ways that the model
presented here could be improved or expanded upon. For
example, the model assumes that candidate ability is
static, and there is no feedback between a candidate’s
ability and their class. Incorporating such feedback may
exacerbate the runaway effect being described. One could
also imagine proposing a model where “ability” is charac-
terized by multiple parameters, rather than a single one,
which could open up a wider space of possible phases
and transitions. The dichotomy of Case I and Case II is
also arbitrary, and, as mentioned briefly in Sec. II, one
could imagine introducing a parameter that interpolates
between the two cases. For example, one could introduce
an interpolation parameter β, such that the variance used
in the prior satisfies σ2prior,n+1 = βσ
2
x + (1− β)σ2ε,nσ2. In
such a description, any β > 0 (i.e., any finite deviation
from Case II) would truncate the transition and give a
finite σ2ε in the steady state.
Finally, it is worth making a comment about demo-
graphic bias. It was assumed in this paper that the exam
is an unbiased estimator of candidate ability. But real-
world examinations often have biases toward one demo-
graphic group or another, which lead to suboptimal rank-
ing and selection of candidates (see, e.g., Refs. [17–19] for
a few illustrative case studies). An especially interesting
question suggested by the results here is whether bias
that exists only in the early rounds of evaluation will
persist indefinitely through later rounds. A natural con-
jecture is that the answer depends on whether w < wc
or w > wc. In the former case, any biases in the early
rounds of exam eventually dissipate, since there remains
8a robust mobility between the two classes. In the lat-
ter case, however, the class mobility rapidly goes to zero,
and any demographic biases from the early rounds are
“frozen in.” This question may be studied using rela-
tively simple modifications of the model presented here,
and deserves further exploration.
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Appendix A: Mean and variance in ability for a
perfectly-selected prestige class
Within the assumption of a normal distribution of can-
didate ability [Eq. (1)], an ideally-selected prestige class
comprises a truncated normal distribution:
Ptr(x) = A exp[−x2/2]Θ(x− xm), (A1)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function and A is a
normalization constant given by
A =
 ∞∫
xm
exp[−x2/2]dx
−1 = √2/pi
erfc[xm/
√
2]
. (A2)
The cutoff xm can be calculated from the requirement
that the total population of the prestige class comprises a
fraction f of all candidates:
∫∞
xm
N (x;µ = 1;σ2 = 1)dx =
f . This relation gives
xm =
√
2 erfc−1(2f), (A3)
as mentioned in Sec. IV. The mean ability of the
optimally-selected prestige class is therefore
µx =
∞∫
xm
xPtr(x)dx =
1√
2pif2
exp
{
− [erfc−1(2f)]2} ,
(A4)
and the variance is
σ2x =
∞∫
xm
(x− µx)2Ptr(x)dx
= 1 +
exp
{
− [erfc−1(2f)]2} erfc−1(2f)
√
pif
−
exp
{
−2 [erfc−1(2f)]2}
2pif2
. (A5)
For f = 0.05, these expressions give xm = 1.645, µx =
2.063, and σ2x = 0.138.
In the limit of asymptotically small f , Eqs. (A4) and
(A5) become
µx '
√
ln
(
1
2pif2
)
, (A6)
and
σ2x '
[
ln
(
1
2pif2
)
ln
(
1
2pif2 ln(1/2pif2)
)]−1/2
. (A7)
This extremely weak dependence on the exclusivity f of
the prestige class implies that, although in principle the
first-order transition exists in a space of two parameters
w and f , in practice the value of f may matter very little.
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